Proprietary Rights of the Communal and Municipal Councils by Takács, Imre
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNAL AND MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
I . TAKÁCS
D epartm en t of Political Law , U niversity  E ötvös L oránd , B udapest 
Received: 30. 3. 1970.
In this paper we propose to survey the comprehensive sphere of problems 
defying a definition with any pretence to precision, namely the sphere of 
problems which, in the framework of the activities of the councils, embraces 
questions of proprietary rights extending from the direct economic activities 
of a local character, displayed by the communal and municipal councils and 
their agencies in their own right, to the performance of economic functions as 
agents of the central sovereign power. This analysis will partly set out from a 
schematic presentation of the social conditions constituting the objective 
basis of the organizational work of the councils. By keeping in mind the 
volume, purpose and rules of management of assets controlled by the com­
munal and municipal councils, we shall make an attem pt at defining the 
principles implied in the proprietary rights advancing the implementation 
of the economic autonomy of the communal and municipal councils. This end 
is also served by a historical retrospect which for this reason will go into 
details more than usual.
The analyses which have set themselves the target of developing the acti­
vities of the councils with a view to consolidating socialist democratism, have 
in each case demonstrated the justification of the economic independence of 
the councils.1 This claim to an independence has been given a particularly 
definite form in the definition of the self-governing character of the councils.
Since its creation self-government has been one of the outstanding features 
of the system of councils. However, owing to conscious attempts at centrali­
zation, this feature was thrust to the background and, apart from a few 
exceptions2, fell victim to a conspiracy of silence. I t  would be hardly worth 
while to enlarge on an analysis of the resultants of the economic languishment 
of the councils exactly at the start. Attention should be focussed rather on the 
way how an effective exploitation of the available material resources could be 
advanced under actual conditions. And to this end we have to rely on the firm 
ideological basis provided by Marxism-Leninism, to the basic notions adapted 
to it, and the statutory regulations carrying these notions into effect. We 
have to make light of formal disputes showing off a semblance of a loyalty to 
principles, such as a discussion of the public character of the councils, which so
far nobody denied, the formal and emphatic assertion of the sovereign cha­
racter without a concrete content, the contraposition of the self-governing 
character and democratic centralism, etc. The clue to the solution of problems 
of principle emerging in this discussion is given by a concrete analysis of the 
social conditions, or more precisely, the establishment of the real social func­
tions of the councils by having recourse to as exact methods as possible, and 
finally the formulation of the conclusions which may be drawn from this 
analysis.
I .
The socialist content of the self-government of communal and municipal councils
and economic independence
1. In almost all upward-tending phases of the growth of socialist demo­
cracy the expansion of council-democracy was in the limelight of interest.3 
Actually there are marked differences as compared to the earlier situation in 
so far as, besides problems of organization, questions of jurisdiction and the 
material conditions of exercising such authority appear on the agenda in 
growing numbers. The expression of the self-governing character of the councils, 
which, on the one part integrates the councils into the totality of the socialist 
state organism, and on the other, guarantees their independence of a high 
degree, in point of fact puts the re-formulation of the spheres of authority of 
the councils on the agenda. The self-government of the councils is embodied 
in the first place by the shaping of the organization and the election of the 
executives. However, in its significance the delimitation of the economic com­
petences in a form fitting the self-governing character is equivalent to the 
former. Notwithstanding the fact that mainly the solution of organizational 
problems came into prominence at that time, the reform of 1954 was a land­
mark in the trend to consolidate democracy based on councils. The expansion 
of spheres of authority in 1954 and the enactment of the new Councils Act 
was considerable improvement as compared to the earlier situation. However, 
it should be remembered that a large number of 1954 provisions could be 
enforced only in 1958, after the defeat of the counter-revolution.
Another phase in the history of the councils is the one from 1960 to 1962. 
In this phase work was placed on broader mass support, even a large theoretical 
apparatus was mobilized,4 and it was thought that large-scale decentralization 
would be the outcome. However, the transfer of authority was going on in 
an extremely protracted manner, was drawn out over many years, whereas 
council contacts with the masses expanded by leaps and bounds, the activity 
of the population became a true factor among the many others acting as 
incentives to the councils.5 At that time mass communication had a signifi­
cant role, which it has preserved to this day. Information of the public was 
improved not only quantitatively but also qualitatively by the spread of 
television.
In the assessment of the economic functions of councils, the introduction 
of the new forms of economic management has brought about appreciable 
changes. In the earlier system of management, the objectives of the economic
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organizational work of the councils had to be planned, too, and development 
targets, even when their achievement relied on local financial resources, had 
to be integrated with the plan centrally, together with the financial cover and 
the guarantee of a production capacity. In this way even an otherwise suc­
cessful communal development activity was made part and parcel of central 
planning, and the factors hampering an expanding local activity could not be 
eliminated.
Eventually the new form of economic management has not only shifted 
the responsibility for the sollution of problems of a local character on the 
councils, but at the same time has provided the means for a solution, and has 
entrusted the councils with the co-ordination of the activities of the various 
economic organizations in the field of regional development.
In conformity with the basic principles of the reform, the councils are 
responsible for settlement development, including the tasks of housing, for 
meeting the communal needs of the population, for the improvement of com­
munal services, and use zoning.
Essentially, earlier tasks manifesting themselves on a local scale had to 
be integrated with the central plans. Consequently, owing to a centralization 
of economic planning, the local agencies were turned into simple posting 
organs. Their decisions were of a formal character, since for practical purposes 
they were handled as mere suggestions only, notwithstanding the fact that 
according to the then doctrinal terminology the councils figured as the go­
vernmental agencies of the topmost type in the local organization, and in the 
usage of the Constitution the councils were the local agencies of sovereign 
power.
Nevertheless enormous efforts were made to liquidate the many centuries- 
old backwardness of the rural communities, but a t the same time attention 
was given also to the development of towns, and here, too, remarkable achieve­
ment could be recorded.6
The budgetary operations of the councils were strongly restricted, gave 
no incentives for expedient management, as all savings were collected from 
the councils. The system failed to create forms of interestedness.
On the other hand, the councils had a considerable share in the implemen­
tation of the investments of the national economy,7 mainly owing to the role 
of the councils in the administration of the housing scheme.
A modification of the scope of council tasks was brought about by a con­
siderable reduction of the guiding, aiding and organizational functions of the 
councils, so important in the initial phase of the agricultural co-operative 
movement, with the gathering strength of the co-operatives. The methods 
underwent a change and consequently the attention of the administrative 
machinery of the councils could be focussed on the supply of the needs of the 
population and the solutions of settlement development problems.
The change-over to the new method of economic management brought about 
the replacement of an exaggerated centralized guidance of national economy, 
the system of issuing instructions, by economic controls, and among these 
in the first place by a gradually expanding application of monetary incentives. 
In the new situation it appears as a peculiar contradiction that state enter­
prises can manage their affairs with an independence greater than that granted 
to the councils which operate as units of the socialist state machinery. The
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establishment of the economic autonomy of the councils and the revision of 
the proprietary rights of the councils are intended to resolve this contradiction.
Whereas earlier somewhat one-sided efforts were made to tackle the 
problem of developing council-democracy from the organizational aspect, it 
now was recognized that the primary safeguard of the socialist self-government 
of councils was the establishment of their independence. The study of their 
proprietary rights fits into the framework of these problems.
Sándor Lakos, in his work already referred to, point-blank puts the ques­
tion, whether “ . . . the right of disposal should be supplemented with real 
proprietary rights . . after he has criticized the concept of the indivisibility 
of socialist ownerslűp “which suggested as if only the central, governmental 
agencies could be the sole depositaries of the proprietary rights of the state.”8
2. So far the analyses purposing the increase of the economic autonomy 
of the councils have in the first place set out from a demand for the develop­
ment of socialist democratism. They have failed to explore to their full depth 
the relations on the ground of which it has become obvious that the growth 
of the role of the councils in the field of economy is the outcome of an objective 
process determined by the material bases of the socialist system of society. 
The broadening scope of the economic organizational functions of the councils 
is in harmony with the present trends of the growth of the socialist state, 
prevailing in the phase of the completion of building up a socialist society, 
and with the ideological statements of Marxism — Leninism on the trends of 
development of socialist statehood. We have to go back to the classical teach­
ings of Marxism —Leninism because in these days, exactly owing to ideological 
differences, considerable discrepancies have become noticeable in the statutory 
regulations of the socialist countries. More explicitly we shall deal only with 
the Yugoslav notions of local agencies and ownership.
In Yugoslavia, “de-etatization”, a large-scale authorization of the com­
munes, which express the direct democracy of the workers, to organize society 
for the satisfaction of material, cultural and other needs, are considered the 
criteria of socialist statehood.
A peculiarity of the methods of Yugoslav theoreticians is the one-sided 
criticism of the majority of the socialist countries. According to their doctrines, 
in the majority of the socialist countries “bureaucratic and centralistic condi­
tions” are prevailing. This description will hold its own only in so far as bureau­
cratism as a danger in fact exists in the performance of the increased functions 
of the socialist state, or if the socialist state fails to take care permanently of 
the development of socialist economy and the consolidation of socialist de­
mocracy. In point of fact, the socialist states have not rejected centralism, 
still they try to apply centralism as conceived by Lenin: “. . . . with democratic 
and socialist centralism neither the application of the same standards, nor 
uniformity introduced from above agree.”9 A certain exaggeration of centralism 
experienced in certain periods does not express the political system as a whole, 
just as Yugoslav decentralization does not express the Yugoslav political 
system. According to the Yugoslav position “in Yugoslav society there are 
’independent systems’ such as the federation, the republic, the provinces, and 
the local communities.”10 However, Lenin’s concept of democratic centralism 
is not conflicting with either federation or territorial autonomy. No matter 
whether federation, or territorial autonony is considered, Soviet power
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embraces a society, much more split into units than Yugoslavia, with all her 
territorial and national communities for building up socialism. The centralism 
of the Soviet state has not made impossible the expression and assertion of
territorial interest. In Lenin’s words “.........democratic centralism does not
preclude autonomy and federation at all . . .  . on the contrary, it presupposes 
the completest freedom of the different regions, moreover of the various 
communities of the State, in the elaboration of the different forms of state, 
social, as well as economic life.”11
The central organs and the territorial agencies in possession of local 
independence are tied together by relations created exactly by the application 
of the principle of democratic centralism. In  this centralism rights of guidance 
are vested in the central organs, however, its methods and its practice gua­
rantee the performance of local functions defined by local competences and, 
in particular, by specific local conditions.
In Yugoslavia “notwithstanding the fact that the economic evening of 
the formerly backward republics would be needed, rather a widening of the 
gap may be observed in consequence of which the backwardness has not only 
been preserved, but even increased.12
With a viewr to the self-government of society, in Yugoslavia the institu­
tions of direct democracy have come into prominence in the place of the re­
presentative system. According to an author writing on the subject “the question 
is not only one of the local community as a commune, a territorial, political 
and social-economic community, i.e. of the co-operation, community of the 
nationals as citizens, but one of the co-operation, community of the workers, 
who work under the circumstances of freely unified collective work and make 
decisions affecting the functions and interests of society as a whole.”13 This 
description accurately reflects the endeavour to present the communes as 
organizational units merging the economic and political functions. In contrast 
to the doctrinal structure and owing to the economic contradictions, the inter­
vention of the central sovereign power has become necessary in a large number 
of fields. On the other hand, notwithstanding the declaration of the principle 
of self-government, the functions of the administrative organization could not 
be restricted appreciably on the present level of development.
Within the framework of the self-government of the workers, the Yugo­
slav theory regards in the sphere of ownership the direct ownership of the 
workers’ collectives as the realization of socialist ownership relations, instead 
of all-national ownership.
The expansion of the proprietary rights of the councils has nothing to do 
with the Yugoslav principles denying the economic functions of the State and 
professing the principle of social self-government. As opposed to the Yugoslav 
principle of social self-government, of the direct proprietary rights of the 
workers void of authoritative interference, in Hungary the proprietary rights 
of the councils would tend to expand the sphere of competence of the repre­
sentative organ possessing rights of self-government as compared to the actual 
rights of a management of property. I.e. the proprietary rights would be trans­
ferred to an intermediate organization, i.e. the organization of the councils 
operating as part of the governmental organization.
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II.
Regulation of Communal Ownership in the Hungarian Bourgeois Legal System
For the purpose of the subject-matter of this paper, the historical retro­
spect in the first place promises notable experience in the field of the regu­
lation of communal ownership. This has to be pointed out in advance in order 
to dispel any interpretation as though we considered earlier communal owner­
ship to have been significant in volume. I t was found on a number of occasions 
that before the Liberation Hungarian rural communities and towns were void 
of the financial resources whose employment would have helped them to 
meet, if only approximately, locally emerging developmental and other com­
munal requirements.
1. The rights of the communities, including their rights of property, was 
after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise brought under regulation by Act 
XVIII of 1871. This Act was shortly afterwards superseded by Act XXII of 
1886 on the communities. This latter act included provisions in two respects: 
in the first place it decreed that all and any parts of the territory of the State 
has to belong to the area of some community.11 Secondly, the jurisdiction of 
the community extends to any property in the community and its area (§. 3). 
The community exercised authority in respect of taxation, registration, etc. of 
any property situated in its area.
The jurisdiction of the community did not extend to a restriction of 
private ownership. On the contrary, the composition of the local government 
bodies, the notion about the functions of local government, operated towards 
supporting an economy based on private ownership.
Pursuant to the provisions of the act, the communities could manage 
their own property. The community had property, of its own, but its rights 
of disposal were subject to limitations.
According to the act the community exercised proprietary rights in res­
pect of things real and personal, it could inherit, accept donation and enter 
into onerous contracts. Within the sphere of proprietary rights, an important 
right of the community was the operation of public utilities.
On the basis of their proprietorship, the communities could acquire pro­
prietary rights and accept such obligations, and could therefore act as juristic 
persons in legal transactions of private law. For a proper management of 
their property the act required the communities to render account. In the 
budget and its enclosures the assets and liabilities of the community had to be 
shown, including any real estate by items, securities, etc.
The limitations on the right of disposal over communal property were the 
following:
a) Among the items of the assets the so-called principal fund had to be 
registered separated from all other items. The principal fund could not be 
reduced or curtailed, the local government body was obliged to preserve it for 
posterity and could use only the proceeds of it. For practical purposes this 
limitation did not tie down the hands of the community in its management 
of the principal fund, as the alienation of property was authorized in the event 
of the inability of the community to pay off its debts from the proceeds of 
taxation. This was called the transformation of the principal fund, and not its
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reduction. Communal real estate, building plots and other land, as well as 
buildings were therefore negotiable, but in the event of alienation the sales 
contract was conditional on confirmation by the chief administrative officer 
of the district.
b) Areas which owing to their character and purpose (streets, squares, 
etc.) were inalienable outside the scope of negotiability under private law.
c) The act decreed that any revenue earlier appropriated for the pur­
poses of the community should be appropriated exclusively for communal 
purposes also in the future.
d) Real estate could be leased only by way of public auction; private 
lease contracts were subject to municipal approval.
e) Within the scope of onerous transactions, in cases of purchase charge­
able to the budget, the communities were obliged to observe the rules go­
verning public contracts.
Hence the purpose of the limitations was partly the preservation of the 
assets on a given level at a given time, partly the safeguarding of the interests 
of the community, at least formally, in given cases even contrary to the deci­
sions of the local government body. As a further guarantee the act provided 
for the financial liability of the members of the communal body for the event 
of management contrary to the law.
The assets of the communities were composed of the following items:
— real estate; securities; deposits on savings accounts; rights attached 
to real estate; endowments; enterprises; chattels which may be given on loan; 
cash surpluses; claims in terms of money; loans; movables.
The communities managed their affairs by making use of these assets, for 
the most part by realizing revenue and expenditure allocated in the budget. 
The communal self-government was obliged to exploit profitably any real 
estate owned by the community, by own management, or by leasing, or by 
way of share-farming. Similarly, securities owned by the community had to 
be used profitably. For the use of money capital, Section 80 of the act provi­
ded tha t the rules governing the orphans’ funds had to be observed. According­
ly capital could be invested in bonds, or could be loaned.
Communal rights extended to liquor licences (or the farming out of licen­
ces), to the right to work a mill, to the right of hilding markets, and to exact 
tolls.
As regards the foundation of communal enterprises, the following prin­
ciples had to be observed: for profit-yielding enterprises the principle of pro­
fitableness was normative. For non-profitable communal utilities, provisions 
had to be made for the coverage of the costs of maintenance. For this purposes 
the communal utilities collected fees.
As an enclosure to the budget, a precise inventory had to be drawn up, 
which showed the assets and liabilities of the community, real property, 
buildings, movables, produce, deposits and securities, interest-bearing and 
non-interest-bearing claims and the communal endowments, the communal 
funds, and the communal debts. In conformity with Section 109 of the act: 
“An inventory shall be taken of the movables and real estate of the commu­
nity, and of institutions supervised by the community, each year, and the 
inventory shall be attached to the final accounts of the community.”
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2. I t  would be illusory to believe as if the communal assets had guaran­
teed the satisfaction of the communal needs on an appropriate level.15 The 
budgetary system conveys a precise idea of the financial stringency of the 
communities. About 71 per cent of the communities had to apply for sub­
sidies from the state budget. Notwithstanding the many restrictions, the 
uncovered estimates amounted to about one third of the estimated expendi­
ture. On the revenue side of the budget, the principal items were incomes from 
communal property, rates and communal excises transferred to the commu­
nity, performances in kind, and loans.15 For uncovered expenditure, the com­
munity could levy rates.17 However, in the majority of the instances, not even 
the rates could restore the budgetaiy equilibrium of communal management. 
Therefore a central fund was formed under the supervision of the minister of 
the interior from which any deficiency could be made good.
Still the registration of assets, the regulations governing the exercise of 
proprietary rights, are points of certain interest. In point of fact, on the basis 
of the right of disposal and the obligation to render account, the communal 
self-governing body was always responsible for the preservation of the pro­
perty of the community, for its administration with proprietary solicitude, 
its utilization, moreover for its augmentation. Although Hungarian bourgeois 
communal self-government, with its local board formed of the representatives 
of the greatest tax-payers, failed to represent the interests of wage-earners 
forming the majority of the population of rural communities and towns, the 
mechanism of regulation nevertheless contained a gist which could be turned 
to good account when it came to enforce certain other social functions.
In particular it is worth while to study the question of communal enter­
prises. Communal enterprises may have had little significance in rural commu­
nities, where at most a mill or a distillery was operated by the community. 
On the other hand in the municipalities a branch or two of the system of 
public utilities could be owned by private capital, others operated as mixed 
enterprises in the form of joint stock companies, still the most general type 
was the public utility or enterprise in municipal ownership.
The commonest form of municipal enterprise was the slaughter-house. 
These were in operation in every town. There were altogether thirteen ice 
factories, twenty two water works and eighteen distilleries in the municipal­
ities. As regards public utilities, seven towns had gas-works, other twenty-nine 
electric works. There were eleven municipal brick-works, two road-construction 
enterprises, four printing presses, seven quarries, altogether eighteen trans­
port companies, seventeen public baths, six undertakings, five theatres, eleven 
cinemas in municipal management. The list would not be complete if no men­
tion were made of workshops of moderate capacities to attend to local needs. 
So there were fourteen blacksmith’s shops and seven joiner’s shops in Buda­
pest in municipal ownership. In the country as a whole, fifty two shops of a 
size not exceeding that of an artisan’s shop were operating.18
Of the municipal enterprises eighty nine operated as registered private 
firms, twenty five as joint stock companies. Among the enterprises there were 
altogether twelve where private capital had proprietary interests. However, 
the majority of the public enterprises owe their existence to the transfer of 
private companies to municipal ownership.
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From what has been set forth so far it is manifest tha t the exploitation 
of communal and municipal property, the enforcement of the right of dis­
posal took place under efficient central supervision. Notwithstanding this 
supervision, the gates were thrown open to the evolution of a proprietary 
attitude and to an establishment of the forms of liability attached to  this 
attitude.
III.
Emergence of Socialist Ownership Relations and the Proprietary Rights of the
Councils
1. Statutory settlement following in the wake of Liberation buttressed 
up self-government property rather than weakened it. In particular in Buda­
pest communal enterprises gained strength.19 Even at the time of nationali­
zation tliis distinction remained, and in the public sector the naming of the 
enterprises so to say laid stress on their distinction from communal enterprises. 
In fact at tha t time the enterprises of the public sector were celled “national 
enterprises”. The Constitution left the question unsettled, and, in point of 
fact, on a constitutional level no provisions were enacted which would have 
precluded the recognition of the ownership of the council in respect of property 
in council management. Namely Section4 of the Constitution defines within 
the sphere of social ownership state, “public”, and co-operative property. The 
second category, i.e. “public” property, among others, denoted the ownership 
of the self-governing bodies, and to this day this provision has been left unchan­
ged in the Constitution. For practical purposes Decree 244/1950. (X. 1.) M.T. 
put an end to the independent ownership of public property by declaring that 
“public real estate is in the ownership of the State”.
When it comes to find an answer to the question of municipal property, 
Hungarian legislation has to depend on the ideological basis which in the 
description of nascent socialist social conditions had given its attention entirely 
to the controversy between capitalism and socialism. The warning of the 
classics of Marxism that notwithstanding the qualitatively new social condi­
tions the features of the old society would survive, fell into oblivion. A more 
thorough analysis of ownership was replaced by a schematic description of 
State and co-operative property.
The circumstance that the socialist revolution was first victorious in an 
economically backward country, burdened with the most patent and keenest 
forms of feudal and capitalist exploitation, in a society imbued with contra­
dictions, and not in a highly developed capitalist country, prevented socialist 
ownership from becoming predominant on the ground of highly developed 
productive forces. After the birth of Soviet power a tendency towards a con­
centration of a high degree was inevitable, and the strong central control left 
its mark also on the regulation of the forms of ownership. “The fact tha t in 
contrast to the original Marxist concept socialism was victorious where the 
standards of production did not only fail to provide the material basis of the 
’realm of freedom’, but where the basic necessaries of a minimum of physical 
existence were not guaranteed, had an extreme effect on the shaping of pro­
perty relations or the method of possession.
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Centralization, which in a relatively short time permeated the system of 
possession in all its aspects, was not only brought about by some sort of an 
intention of scientific management, but so to say enforced by an insistent 
command
a) to fight hunger,
b) to carry through industrialization at a rapid pace, and
c) not in the last resort by a drive for civilization launched in an extre­
mely keen manner.”20
No sooner had the socialist state been created than ownership became the 
subject matter of legal regulation. However much Marx warned against the 
illusion as if ownership could be expressed by legal forms with any pretence to 
accuracy, legal regulation had no assert the principal pecularities of socialist 
property relations. Notably
— the differences manifesting themselves on the basis of the development 
stage of the productive forces continued to remain. In fact the conditions of 
production of a new type and free of exploitation did not preclude a segre­
gation of interests even within an identity of interests (state or co-operative 
ownership);
— in the society of the transition period production of commodities did 
not cease. However, production of commodities segregate the socialist orga­
nizations of labour, guarantee their independence, and at the same time by 
way of commodity relations regulate their reciprocal relations, because in 
principle the relations are built upon an exchange of equivalents (legal position 
of the enterprises);
— the difference of essential and surplus production and the collection of 
the latter remain: the distribution of incomes takes place on the level of the 
national economy controlled by the State according to plan, and not on the 
level of the organizations of labour.
These peculiarities find an expression in the circumstance that socialist 
law draws a line between state property, expressing an all-national or all­
social character, and co-operative property, which as group property is segre­
gated from state property not only because of the narrower sphere of the 
subjects of co-operative ownership, but also because of the form of appropri­
ation. Hence actually there are two current forms of social ownership. Al­
though the common traits of these forms are prevalent, still a differentiation 
is justified.
In an investigation into the ownership relations the significance of the 
organization is obvious. Direct appropriation, the direct exercise of ownership 
rights have become impossible in view of a developed division of labour. The 
direct organizations of labour may become subjects of partial rights, still “at 
the present stage of development social ownership may only mean a social 
process transmitted by some sort of an organization.” “. . . the transmitting 
organization is primarily always some sort of an organization of labour.”21
2. In these days, when for the extension of the independence of the local 
councils the shaping of their self-governing character of a socialist content is 
the order of the day, the expansion of the proprietary rights of the councils 
has become inevitable. I t cannot be argued that even in the actual method of 
council management the sphere of assets placed at their disposal is definable. 
As regards these assets, the rights of the councils exceed those of pure mana-
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gerial rights. The councils exercise functions as partial owners, functions which 
for ¡iractical purposes are scarcely limited, still in their acts they appear not as 
owners, but as trustees of assets under the disposition of the councils.
Thus the state exercises its proprietary rights through state enterprises 
only in part . The partial proprietary rights exercised by the councils are of no 
great significance. Still the councils are integrated into an accounting system 
incorporated in the framework of the state budget, i.e. into an accounting 
system which is somewhat stricter than tha t of enterprises.
The councils’ rights of property management extend to objects constitut­
ing parts of state property, whose central administration has not been solved, 
whereas their enterprisal administration would be unreasonable. For instance, 
the councils have to take care of the utilization of reserve plots owned by the 
State. Statutory provisions authorize the councils also to sell real estate in 
state ownership. In the majority of instances part or even the whole of the 
purchase price forms council revenue, and is allocated to development funds.22 
Consequently the councils may enforce a development policy subservient to 
local interests, in which the councils may dispose by sale of assets forming state 
property, appropriate the proceeds for construction satisfying local needs, or 
for the extension of existing ones. So by the sale of small dwellings in state 
ownership, or of state reserve plots which cannot be exploited for agricultural 
production, by shaping a local building plot policy, the councils —on the ba­
sis of statutory provisions — today enjoy rights of disposal which, though not 
formally, make them owners in respect to contents. However, the contradic­
tion will become still more accentuated when, in the event of the purchase 
of real estate, the councils act in their own name and enjoy greater indepen­
dence, whereas at alienation they could only rarely act as proprietors.23 Ho­
wever, councils cannot acquire ownership in their own name through testa­
mentary succession.
The contradictory character of the limited ownersip rights of the councils 
has to be recognized even more in the event of objects of ownership created as 
the outcome of a venture undertaken by relying on its own recources. This 
contradiction could be relieved, if council enterprises were taken up in the 
list of socialist forms of ownership as the property of the councils. On the part 
of the enterprises this would imply appreciable differences in comparison to 
the position of state enterprises. Within the sphere of proprietary management, 
the executive committees of the councils, or their specialized agencies, exercise 
authority similar to those of ministries. Namely Government Decree 11/1967. 
(V. 13.) Korin, on state enterprises endows executive committees with the 
right to establish enterprises. All other functions of proprietary management 
come within the jurisdiction of the specialized agencies of executive committees.
3. The theoretical question presents itself: what different forms are 
established by the evolutional laws of proprietary relations within the sphere 
of social ownership ?
Here investigations will be confined to the scope of state property. The 
segregation of the other form of socialist property, i.e. co-operative property, 
is from the outset defined by the dissimilarity of the subjects of ownership.
Within the scope of state ownership, first the question will have to be 
answered, whether the maintenance of a unified and indivisible notion of 
property has any theoretical foundations and significance, when in addition
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to the economic approach sociological, legal and financial considerations may 
have to be resorted to in an analysis of the policy-making aspects of the 
question.
The position taken by jurisprudence is clear-cut in so far as in shaping 
the forms of ownership the legislator has to reckon with the actual social con­
ditions which determine the trend of development and the content of socialist 
ownership. Property expresses social conditions which in the first place are 
defined by the standard of the productive forces and which reflect the mutual 
relations of the particular groups or classes of society originating from the 
position occupied by these groups and classes in social production and from 
their association with the means of production. All-national ownership is an 
abstract category capable of expressing that any class or group of society 
has come into gear in a uniform manner with the objects of property in all­
national ownership, without the risk of relations reminding of exploitation 
developing among them. Hence all-national ownership expresses the socialist 
character of ownership relations so developed. However, the concept of all- 
national ownership does not necessarily preclude that in conformity with 
statutory provisions the local agency of the state, performing public functions, 
organized on a representative basis and enjoying self-government rights, i.e. 
the local councils, should figure as the subjects of proprietary rights.
This method of exercising proprietary rights does not run counter to opinions 
on all-national ownership. Theoretically the all-national character is expressed by 
a construction which in the sphere of relations to the means of production distin­
guishes the quality of being a worker from that of a citizen. By means of this 
construction, and by drawing a line between the peculiar position of the wor­
kers’ collectives taking part in social production and the proprietary position 
of the totality of citizens, this construction solves the problem of an indirect 
exercise of proprietary rights trough the intervention of the sovereign power, 
and rejects the Yugoslav concept construing direct proprietary rights. As far 
as all-national ownership is concerned, the citizen realizes his proprietary 
rights through the intervention of the sovereign power. And for that matter the 
insertion of the sovereign power justifies an inquiry into the question of the 
level of governmental agencies which would be called to exercise proprietary 
functions. In the light of the functions devolving on the councils, a rejection of 
the proprietary character of the council on the ground of its implying the risk 
of dividing the unity of state ownership appears to be wholly unjustified.
On studying the nature of ownership we cannot forgo the approach which 
believes to have discovered the origin of segregation within the framework of 
all-national ownership in the social purpose, functions and management of the 
objects of ownership.
The politico-economic method of approach to the exploration of the 
origins of segregations of social ownership relies on the social organizations of 
labour. Undoubtedly, this approach amounts to a primary recognition of the 
communities so decisive for the creation of the vital conditions of society. 
However, the sphere of collectives emerging in a socialist society cannot be 
blocked on this level; even if not of a wholly determining character, the col­
lectives which come into being on the ground of a territorial distribution of 
the population, creating collectives of domicile, i.e. rural or urban collectives, 
are of decisive significance. Whereas the productive oi’ganizations of labour
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come into possession of partial ownership rights as a result of producing of 
material goods, the councils representing territorial communities may lay a 
claim to proprietary rights, partly in view of the purpose of assets entrusted 
to their management, partly owing to the local character of the material resour­
ces ensuring their maintenance and development, and on the basis of the 
spontaneous contributions of the population.
Special mention has to be made of the constitution of the German De­
mocratic Republic of 1968, which in connexion with the regulation of the 
economic foundations, and in the sphere of problems of planned economy, 
emphasizes the responsibility of the units of socialist production and the local 
agencies of the sovereign power. Section 41 of the Constitution declares: 
“Within the framework of central state planning and guidance, the socialist 
enterprises, municipalities, communities and associations of communities are 
communites of independent responsibility, where the citizens are doing work 
and are shaping their social conditions.” However, the Constitution drawns no 
conclusions as to ownersliip.
4. As regards their function, a large sphere of the objects of ownership 
seive the satisfaction of social needs which are outside the scope of productive 
activités, still they remain indispensable conditions of the continuity of so­
cialist social production and the realization of expanded socialist re-production. 
The network of sanitary institutions, the educational and cultural establish­
ments meet primary social exigencies, through a system of institutions guaran­
teeing a supply of these needs on a basic, intermediate, or national level. In 
this way we may speak of institutions which in pursuance to their social 
functions aie tied to a territory and a scope of duties, and operated in confor­
mity with the statutory regulation adapted to their nature. Of the objects of 
ownership included here the maintenance, guidance and operation of the insti­
tutions taking care of the supply of needs on a basic or intermediate level come 
within the competence of the local councils. Hence a differentiation will be 
brought about which has its origin in objective factors. However, the con­
struction of ownership fails to follow this course, a circumstance eventually 
leading to contradictions of various character.
a) The first contradiction manifests itself between the rights of the 
councils and the enterprisal rights established since the introduction of the 
reform of economic management. Within the category of all-national ownership, 
irrespective of whether it is a productive or commercial enterprise, the partial 
proprietary rights of an enterprise are by far more extensive than those of the 
agencies of the councils operating within the framework of the united socialist 
state. This is a factor operating against the highly desirable extension of the 
autonomy of councils.
b) The other contradiction appears between the social functions of the 
objects of ownership satisfying the local needs and their belonging to the all- 
national form of ownership. Apart from the circumstance tha t investments 
and operative costs allocated in the state budget have an important role in the 
creation and operation of these objects of ownership, central state guidance 
expressing the all-national nature has been restricted to the promulgation of cer- 
tain aggregate norms. The rules defined within the legislative jurisdiction of the 
state agencies among others apply in the same way to the management and 
operation of co-operative property. The fact that primary and secondary
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education is a precondition of meeting the obligation of compulsory school 
attendance, or the exercise of the citizens’ right to education, does not affect 
the local character of the operation of the institutions supplying basic or 
secondary education. The normative regulation is an adequate guarantee for 
the assertion of all-social interests and the fundamental rights of the citizens.
c) Coming back to the function of the state budget, we shoudl like to 
add two remarks. First, for the creation and operation of institutions of a local 
character, the local organs extensively rely on the co-operation of the popula­
tion, on its contribution in the form of voluntary social work or financial contri­
bution. The state ownership form does not give expression to this indirect 
contribution and is not incentive enough to the imputation. Secondly, in general 
the expenditure estimated in the state budget on a given territorial unit may 
be covered from revenue collected in this territorial unit. Presumably the social 
productive activities of a given territory contribute to the production of the 
national income by the ration of its share from budgetary expenditure. Any 
discrepancies which may appear, mutually compensate one an-other. Although 
underlying calculations are wanting, the practical realization of the principle 
of self-financing would be closely associated with the self-governing character 
of the councils. By collecting part of surplus revenues, allocations could be 
made to a fund from which any deficiency could be made good. On this under­
standing the conclusion may be drawn that the actual method of budgetary 
financing is an irrelevant factor for the purpose of a definition of ownership.
d) The obligation to render account of the use, preservation, or augmen­
tation of council property would emphasize the responsibility of the executives 
of the council before the corporate agencies and the responsibility of the cor­
porate agencies before the population as a whole, in a way difficult to assess at 
the present juncture. In this way the recognition of the proprietary rights of 
the councils would promote the evolution of socialist democratism in a most 
direct manner.
IV.
The financial bases of the economic organizing activities of the councils
In the centre of economic organizational work are settlement develop­
ment, municipal or communal economy, the communal supply of the population 
and, finally, the satisfaction of hygienic, social and cultural needs. A conside­
rable part of the costs of these functions is covered from budgetary means and 
by maintaining a network of institutions controlled by the council. I t  is there­
fore a reasonable demand that the councils should have a viable economy of 
their own. In budgetary management, provisions ought to be made for the 
councils’ accumulating the funds for the coverage of their expenditure them­
selves (the principle of self-financing). This would place them in a position to 
specify their functions of development and renewal and their operative costs 
autonomously, naturally under an obligation to observe the budgetary index 
numbers. However, a system of this type presupposes the existence of an 
elaborate control and a guarantee to make good any deficiencies in the budget.
Already at present, and in principle, the councils are acquainted with the 
trend in their revenues and the degree of expectable subsidies from the state
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budget for a period of five years in advance.2'1 However, the revenues depend 
to a negligible degree only on the trends in the productive activities in the 
given territory. An initial step towards bringing about a change in the situ­
ation is the introduction of rates. I t  is not unlikely that the councils will take 
greater interest in an increase of their revenue, namely an increase proportio­
nate to the results of budgetary management and of the operations of enter­
prises in the ownership, further to the volume of the productive or commercial 
activities of enterprises or co-operatives not subordinate to the councils.
The weight and social significance of the functions incumbent on the 
councils are well illustrated by a few numerical returns of the budget and 
national economy.
The distribution of the fixed assets by controlling authorities as of 1st 
January, 1968 was as follows: the value of fixed assets of institutions and agen­
cies financed from the budget was 124.3 thousand million forints, whereof 
61.7 thousand million forints were in council management. This means a share 
of the councils of nearly 50 per cent.
At the same time the gross value of enterprisal fixed assets was 618.7 
thousand million forints. Of this sum 28,7 thousand million forints represented 
the fixed assets of council-owned enterprises, i.e. a sum not quite 5 per cent 
of the total.
These data throw a realistic light on the functions of the councils in eco­
nomic work. Their activities extend to production at a moderate rate only, 
although this is a significant factor at their revenues. The councils are active 
rather in the supply of services for the population. Still the councils ought to 
accept a larger share in the organization of production by defining the targets 
of development. Their co-operation could be advanced appreciably by the 
introduction of council ownership which would shift greater responsibilities 
on them.
Naturally the proprietary rights of the councils will by themselves help 
little towards a liquidation of the territorial disproportion in the development 
of the national economy, nor operate effectivelly — without central assistance 
— towards making up the lags. But they may advance the territorial prin­
ciple to a higher degree in comparison to the branch pattern. A single numerical 
returns may suffice to convey an idea of the actual territorial disproportions. 
Whereas in the socialist industry the per capita value of fixed assets is on a 
national basis 22.440 forints, the figures of a few counties show a sharp contrast:
Komárom, Borsod, Nógrád and Fejér 28.670 forints
Budapest 35.970 forints
Szabolcs-Szatmár 4.863 forints
Disproportions of this degree cannot be made good unless by an allocation
of central governmental means for investments.
1. The overwhelming portion of sanitary, social, educational and cultural 
needs are met from the budgetary management of the councils. Institutions 
providing the supply of basic and mid-level needs are controlled by the 
councils.
Maintenance and development of the social, sanitary and cultural services 
have to be met by budgetary means. In the social and sanitary services, the 
institutions controlled by the communities and municipalities are the créohes,
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the maternity homes and the surgeries. Hospitals and dispensaries are muni­
cipality-controlled, whereas larger hospitals, nui-sing homes, infants’ and 
children’s homes, social homes, the epidemiological services are controlled by 
the county authorities.
Council-controlled institutions include
75 per cent of the hospital beds
98 per cent of the accommodations in infants’ homes
97 per sent of the accommodations in the crèches
98 per cent of the accommodations in the kindergartens
99 per cent of the school children attend the general schools of the coun­
cils, and
90 per cent the secondary schools of the councils.
On the estimates of 1970 on the expenditure side allocations to the coun­
cils amount to 11.7 per cent. The salient figures are:
85 per cent of the health service, an
92 per cent of the social services 
are to be financed from the allocations to the councils.
Of the educational institutions, the maintenance of the institutions of 
primary education come within the competence of the communities and towns. 
The secondary schools may be both communal and municipal-controlled, 
whereas both the municipalities and the counties have a share in the super­
vision of specialized secondary education. There is still a considerable number 
of institutions of secondary education which, owing to the specialized training 
provided by them, are under direct ministerial control, although the majority 
of the technical schools and schools for professional training meet the la­
bour demands of the respective county, or of smaller regions. These insti­
tutions are therefore closely linked up with the labour force economy of a 
given region.
The revenue side of the budget still reflects striking disproportions. The 
own revenue of the councils amounts to 70.7 per cent of the total revenue, 
whereas state appropriations figure with 29.3 per cent.
As regards the institutions financed from the budget, the councils have 
extensive competencies even today. An extension of their rights would in 
fact give expression to their responsibility to the population, improve their 
administrative activities and encourage them to make greater sacrifices for 
the maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the system of institutions 
on their own initiative.
2. In addition to the budget, another important form of council manage­
ment is the administration of development funds. Originally the administration 
of development funds differed from the budget in so far as owing to the fund­
like administration credits could be used from accumulations at any time, 
irrespective of the fiscal period. Another characteristic trait of fund-like manage­
ment is the improved chance of increasing local revenue, and that in addition 
to using financial means, extensive use could be made of voluntary work by the 
population (development of the network of public utilities by voluntary work, 
etc.).
In 1970 the estimated incomes of the development fund amount to more 
than ten thousand million forints. Of this sum 10 per cent are surpluses from 
savings of the previous year. One per cent of the total income is derived from
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bank credits; 7 thousand million forints are budget appropriations, whereas 
local income amounts to 1,8 thousand million forints.
The local sources of income of the development fund are as follows:
communal rates (2 per cent of disbursed wages and salaries);
contributions of the populations to communal development (2 to 3 per
cent assessed on the general income tax of the population);
the percental share of the allowance for depreciation of council-controlled
enterprises;
fees for the use of building plots (according to the area used by the enterprises).
From the development, fund investments for the improvement of the 
standards of services, in the spheres of the health service, education, the impro­
vement of the equipment of the various institutions, and communal develop­
ment are financed.
The gradual liquidation of the difference between budgetary management 
and the development funds is in its beginnings. Actually, savings from the 
budget may be carried over to the next year, and a wider scope has been opened 
to a re-allocation of funds among the particular items of the budget.
3. The councils have to take care of the organization of the supply of the 
population. Therefore they are responsible for the commercial and industrial 
services. The performance of a considerable portion of these functions is advan­
ced by the co-ordinating and influencing activities of the councils. In addition 
to financial means placed at their disposal, the councils employ their supervi­
sory and official authority (as far as the development and operations of co­
operative industry and trade, and of private small-scale industry are concerned.) 
A smaller portion of the needs are supplied by council-owned enterprises. 
Through these enterprises the councils guarantee the supply of the market, 
industrial repair work and other services.
As will be clear from the structure of the budget, the significance of enter- 
prisal economy is not restricted to a supply of the needs of the population. 
Enterprisal economy is closely associated with the drive for the accumulation of 
the coverage of budgetary expenditure. However, the councils’ right to estab­
lish enterprises is still under close central supervision. The minister having 
competence in the particular branch may find necessary to give an opinion, and 
also the approval of the minister of finance is needed for a new foundation. The 
problem of the foundation of joint council and co-operative enterprises is still 
unsettled.
What is called county-centrism is often responsible for controversies. 
Mainly on the part of the towns, objections have been raised to the county 
supervision of communal enterprises for many years. The gradual transfer of 
enterprises to municipal control is in full swing now, in particular when the 
enterprise in question is one serving the supply of the needs of the population 
of a town.
a) Owing to the frequent re-shuffling of the scope of activities of the enter­
prises and the numerous reorganizations in the meantime, the number of enter­
prises will hardly provide a footing for the appraisal of development. In 1960- 
thousand council enterprises were operating with a complement of 366,651. 
The value produced amounted to 20 thousand million forints, the turnover to 
35 thousand million forints. In 1967, 732 enterprises were controlled by the
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councils, with altogether 405,275 workers. The consolidated production and 
turnover value was close to 77 thousand million forints.
There is a lively debate in progress on the delimitation of the enterprisal 
activities of the councils. No objections have been raised by those taking part 
in the discussions against an organization of the public utilities in the form of 
council-controlled enterprises, or the maintenance of enterprises supplying 
communal needs by the councils, etc. However, there are opinions according 
to which the industrial activities of the councils ought to be restricted to the 
repairing and servicing branches of industry. Production for the market should 
be licenced only as long as it can rely on local raw material and waste-material 
resources.
Accordingly, the purpose of council-controlled industries is rather variega­
ted. Its primary function is the supply of communal services indispensable for 
the population. Similarly to the social, sanitary and cultural institutions operat­
ing under a budget system, here, too, an exchange of equal values is unrealiz­
able. In  view of their influence on the standard of life the prices of the services 
have been fixed at a rather low level. Consequently the enterprises provid­
ing public utilities subsist on appropriations from the state budget. Hence 
services in council management are not profit-yielding enterprises. The pro­
prietary role of the councils in the case of the enterprises providing communal 
services would in particular be expressive of the organizational activities of a 
public authority serving the interests of the population, performing this acti­
vity in the course of the operation of the objects of ownership in duty bound, 
and being responsible for it.
After the institution-controlling activities, yet another sphere has been 
explored where the local demands made on the councils would manifest them­
selves in a still more decided form, were the councils in a proprietary position 
to attend to their functions.
b) As for size, the council-controlled industries consist of small and me­
dium-size units. This industry has a distinct role in providing the necessary 
services, in expanding the assortment of consumers’goods, and in the co-opera­
tion with large enterprises. Another function of local industry displaying the 
humaneness of the socialist state is the employment of partially incapacitated 
persons and the extension of the scope of outside work.
Although in 1965 it was not yet generally recognized that in the building 
material, textile industries, in home-work in certain branches of industry 
(telecommunication), in the food industry, in industrial services and public 
utilities owing to its readiness for quick self-accommodation a local industrial 
enterprise (controlled by the council or a co-operative) would be the preferred 
form, still the returns already tend to confirm the viability of the council- 
controlled industry.
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In the particular branches the following rations were recorded in 1965:
Percental d istribu tion  of Average No. of enterprisal
all-national production employees
B ranch o f industry Ministe- Council Co-ope- M iniste- Co-ope-rial ra t ive ria l ra t ive
industry industry
Machine building ............................................... 9 1 .4 2 .6 4 .6 1 .4 2 .6 3 0 3 9 0 18 0
Building m a te r i a ls ............................................. 9 3 .8 4 .1 1 .3 0 .8 2 .0 7 0 2 2 0 19 0
Processing industry  ........................................ 6 1 .9 1 2 .9 1 8 .6 6 .6 1 .0 6 0 3 3 0 14 0
P rin ting  in d u s t r y ............................................... 8 2 .0 1 3 .0 — 5 .0 6 7 0 2 1 0 —
Textile, c lo th in g ................................................. 5 4 .6 1 2 .6 2 6 .2 6 .6 2 .4 5 0 4 7 0 17 0
L eather, shoes ................................................... 6 7 .7 5 .3 1 9 .3 7 .7 2 .8 6 0 4 9 0 1 4 0 25
Percentage o f to ta l num ber of employees
B ranch of economy Council Co-operative
Total
enterprise
In d u stry  .................................................................................................... 8 .6 1 3 .2 2 1 .8
Building trade  ......................................................................................... 1 4 .4 1 9 .4 3 3 .8
A griculture +  forestry -f w ater conservancy .................................... 1 .8 81 .1 8 2 .9
T ransport and  telecom m unication ................................................... 11 .5 0 .4 1 1 .9
Hom e t r a d e ................................................................................................ 4 1 .1 2 5 .2 6 6 .3
In the enterprises under council management and m co-operatives supervi­
sed by the councils, in 1968, referred to the national economy as a total, the 
number of employees showed the following percental distribution:
The significance of the council-owned enterprises for the council finances is 
confirmed by the fact that among the own revenues of the councils the contri­
butions of the council-owned enterprises figure with about 6 thousand million 
forints in 1970.
The public utilities occupy a peculiar position in the new system of econo­
mic management. A characteristic trait of the public utilities is that they 
supply the basic necessities of life for the population, provide direct and per­
manent services, through the establishment of high technical standards, and a 
quasi-enterprisal operation of systems of net-works (water, sewer, gas, district 
heating systems, local transport, etc.). On the enterprisal side the monopo­
listic position of these enterprises does not show itself at its best. The enterprise 
is bound to prepare for peaks, occasionally consuming top capacity. At the 
same time, owing to the limitation of the capacity of the network, the enterpri­
ses are authorized to subject to a scrutiny any new demands for services forth­
coming from the field.
The public utilities are subject to the specialized agencies of the councils in 
Budapest and in the counties. However, on the professional, all-national level, 
as many as four ministries exercise supervisory rights, specify technical condi­
tions, prescribe accounting methods, the content of the annual reports, etc. 
This constradiction is made even worse by the fact that these records, accounts,
and reports lack the council approach. In the guidance of public utilities not 
only the territorial principle, but also branch principles have a word to say. The 
performance of the peculiar functions of the public utilities would be greatly 
advanced by their transfer into the ownership of the councils.
V.
Definition of the scope and character of council ownership
1. Budget-financed institutions controlled by the communal and municipal 
councils ought to be transferred into their ownership with the proviso, however, 
that for their maintenance and operation in both professional and financial 
respects the governmental regulations should be made binding on the coun­
cils.
As a matter of course, council ownership would in this case extend to the 
buildings, offices, official quarters and building sites.
Streets, roads, squares in the built-in area of a town or rural community, 
similarly unbuilt plots in state ownership, homestead plots, state reserve land, 
roads, water courses should remain in state ownership. Management and 
alienation of these by the councils should take place in conformity with effective 
statutory provisions. This is insisted on by the interests of traffic, water regula­
tion, a centrally controlled building plot policy and settlement development. 
On the other hand dwellings in state ownership should be transferred into 
council ownership, as assets of an expressly local character, supplying primary 
necessities of life, for the preservation and rehabilitation of w'hich the councils 
should be responsible. Of all assets, these constitute perhaps the greatest 
burden; but even at the present more abstract form of state ownership, respon­
sibility for the management of state-owned flats rests on the councils.
2. Within the competence of the council, the right to establish enterprises 
should be guaranteed unchanged. I t  would be justified to refer the decision on 
the establishment of enterprises to the exclusive competence of the coun­
cils. The enterprise would then become the property of the founder council. 
The starting assets would include funds placed by the council at the enterprise’s 
disposal. For that matter the legal position of a council-owned enterprise is 
wholly uniform with that of a ministry-controlled enterprise.
The question may be asked whether the provisions on preliminary agree­
ment actually in force could be mitigated for smaller, in particular communal 
councils. Preliminary agreement is justified, still, because within the sphere of 
the rights of larger communities enterprisal management is wholly feasible, it 
would be sufficient to obtain the preliminary opinion of the competent depart­
ment of the county council and the Directorate of Revenues of the Ministry of 
Finance in the matter of licence.
3. So far mainly the proprietary rights of municipal and communal councils 
have been discussed, although the direct guiding organs of both budgetary 
institutions and enterprisal agencies are councils of a higher level in many 
cases. By this method of dealing with the subject-matter we have tried to give 
expression to the opinion that of the councils of various levels, mainly the 
autonomy of the municipal and communal councils, i. e. councils in direct
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contact with the population, and better acquainted with the needs of their 
jurisdictions, should be reinforced, and consequently proprietary rights should 
be widened on this level. However, the problem of enterprises inevitably sug­
gests the endowment of the councils of a higher level with the same rights.
A special problem is that of county enterprises already in operation. In 
our opinion the transfer of communal enterprises, supplying the needs of a 
town into council ownership is indispensable. A joint municipal-district enter­
prise is within the range of possibility, still the county control of servicing 
enterprises (pharmacy centres, chimney-sweep enterprises, cinemas, undertak­
er’s shops, building enterprises, designing offices, etc.) supplying the larger 
part or even the whole of a county should be maintained. At the actual founda­
tion of an enterprise, or at the decision of the question of the future control 
of an enterprise, considerations of organization, economic policy and such of 
guidance, have in all events to be taken into account.
4. In addition to council ownership, obviously the legal institution of 
“administration” ensuring rights for the council in respect of assets remaining 
in state ownership, and conferring rights of the actual extent on the councils, 
should be maintained. Hence the council is either owner or administrator of the 
assets possessed by it.28 In particular in respect of assets in the exclusive 
ownership of the state the limitation remains that the council cannot exercise 
ownership rights on them.
5. The foundation of joint enterprises is still a matter calling for statutory 
regulation. In principle the councils may even today agree with centrally 
controlled enterprises as well as co-operatives and call to life joint enterprises. 
However, the partial properietary rights of the councils are still undefined. 
When it is the case of an institution it is thought to be almost a matter of 
course that following upon the foundation (or approval) all obligations of 
maintenance should burden the councils. Council ownership would for the 
purpose of maintenance, operation, use and distribution of the profits make 
possible a distribution of the co-proprietary obligations and rights by shares, or 
even the incorporation of methods departing from this principle, in the agree­
ment.
6. The definition of the scope of activities of council-owned enterprises, or 
more extensively formulated, the definition of the notion of local industry, is an 
extremely argued question. However, the dynamic evolution of economic 
life cannot tolerate an accurate definition, as even the widest definition might 
prove restrictive in an actual situation. Therefore the sphere of the formation of 
council-owned enterprises ought to be given an extensive construction. Respon­
sibility concomitant of autonomous management, the system of financial 
interest and the limitation of the financial means are all factors which automatic­
ally control council activities. Still when necessary the managerial activities 
may be marshalled into the proper channel by way of central economic controls 
or normative limitations.
On considerations of incentive it would be justified to come to the aid of the 
councils by guaranteeing them credits on preferential terms. For the purpose of 
the promotion of foreign trade activities of the national economic system, 
foreign currency allocations should be made to council-owned enterprises 
producing for export.
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Specially defined regulators are needed for servicing, communal and local 
transport enterprises, whose activities, owing to their character of public utili­
ties, cannot be adapted to the principle of profit-yielding. Even in the future, 
special rules will have to be made for subsidizing council-owned enterprises 
of this type, and for collecting their incomes.
7. It is beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinize centrally controlled 
enterprises from the point of view of a justification of decentralization. In the 
first place the forms of subordination of the building trade and the road mainte­
nance organization are strongly argued. Still the problem can be studied only 
in the light of the allocations for investments placed at the disposal of the 
councils. As a matter of fact, the productive activities of the councils for their 
own purposes depend on the ratios by which the local and central agencies get a 
share of the budget allocations for investments.
In addition to defining the level in the administrative hierarchy in charge 
of the supervision of enterprises, another problem of extreme importance, yet 
still unsettled, crops up, namely the question of the share of the authorities 
in the guidance of enterprises as far as this is associated with the exercise of 
executive functions. This share embraces partly the exercise of the traditional 
rights of the authorities in control of industry, partly the competence of a local 
price authority. The exercise of these functions extends equally to the central, 
council-owned and co-operative enterprises. In order that considerations of 
convenience prevailing in the guiding activities should not interfere with the 
performance of executive functions, the functions to be performed by the 
authorities should preferably be entrusted to departments segregated from the 
agency in charge of carrying into effect the principles of economic jiolicy.
Hence the fundamental question, whether within the scope of socialist 
ownership assets destined for local use, i.e. assets for local purposes produced 
by local co-operation should be segregated as council-owned property, decidedly 
has been answered in the affirmative. As regards the second part of the question, 
as far as the origin of this form of ownership is concerned we agree with the 
position that as for its subjects council-owned property is not group property, 
and in it the all-national proprietary nature still prevails. As a matter of fact 
this property is exploited through the agency of the local organs of the socialist 
state on the one part, and on the other it is not restricted to the exclusive 
service of local interests, as these local interests are at the same time all­
social interest.
The larger portion of council-owned property consists of assets, real estate 
and equipment destined for the operation of institutions, and exploited in 
conformity with the uniform rules governing the budget. Another portion of 
the property is exploited for the foundation of productive, servicing and com­
mercial enterprises. The legal independence of the enterprises is guaranteed 
in conformity with the general regulations, however, for the efficacy of their 
economic guiding activities the councils may apply special preferences for 
influencing enterprisal operations. In particular the development of communal 
services and the subsidization of enterprises serving social ends calls for the 
introduction of special forms of interestendness.
The most straightforward form of council-owned property is communal 
and municipal property. This form should be preferred within as wide a scope 
as permitted by circumstances. This does not prevent council agencies of a
1 3 8  I .  t a k A c s
higher level and having economic autonomy from becoming to a limited extent 
the owners of their enterprises or institutions meeting needs of a specifically 
regional character, still expressly tied to a fixed place.
The statutory and legitimate exploitation of council-owned property in 
harmony with socialist social and political ends and for the achievement of 
the targets of national planning are guaranteed by
a) the guiding role of the socialist state, which, by having recourse to 
the means of executive power, may in conjunction with normative regulation 
and economic incentives enforce the realization of the ideas of the central 
sovereign power and the exploitation of council-owned property in accordance 
with the national plan.
b)  As for its character, council-owned property is socialist property, 
equivalent to state property and constituting part of all-national property. 
This determines the exercise of proprietary rights and the method of alienation. 
The citizens of the state, who in a given territory on the basis of their domicile, 
education, or enforcement of their civic rights, make use of the services of 
council-controlled institutions, may take part on equal terms in the use of 
the objects of property.
r,) The councils exercising proprietary rights act as parts of the organi­
zation of the united socialist sovereign power. The councils are bound to use 
the objects of ownership for the satisfaction of the needs of the population 
represented by them, by observing the statutory provisions governing posses­
sion and use of these objects, and the statutory limitations of the right of 
disposal (restraint on alienation, restraint on leasing, restriction of entering 
into onerous contracts, etc.).
The following are the institutional forms of central control:
— purchase and sale of real estate is subject to the licence of a superior 
authority;
— economic and fiscal control of the organizations financed by the state 
budget;
— auditing of the closing accounts of the enterprises, control of their 
payment of taxes and the remittance of the budgeted amounts.
d) The basic means of production remain in the ownership of the state 
even afterwards. By the exploitation of these means of production the central 
agencies of the state may effectively influence the trends of development of 
the national economy.
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per cen t of the com m unal budgetary  revenue was derived from  com m unal incomes, 9.2 per cent, 
from s ta te  subsidies, and  31.1 per cen t from  rates (ibid. p. 37).
18 Cf. Dr. Szigeti, G yula: M agyarország városi üzemei és vá lla la ta i (M unicipal Factories and  
E nterprises o f H ungary), S tatisztikai Közlemények, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1933, pp. 5 — 6.
19 I t  would occur hard ly  to anybody  living in B udapest th a t  the designation “ K özért” 
originally referred to the com m unal form  of enterprise.
-° H egedűs, A ndrás: A dalékok a  tu lajdonviszonyok szociológiai elemzéséhez (C ontributions 
to  the Sociological Analysis o f P roperty  R elations) M agyar Filozófiai Szemle, 1969, No. 6, p. 1131.
21 Világhy, Miklós: A szocialista gazdasági rend alkotm ányos alapjairó l (On th e  C onstitu ­
tional Bases of th e  Socialist O rder o f Economy) MS.
22 This has been decreed by  th e  M inistry of A griculture and  Food In d u s try  and  the Mi­
n is try  of Housing and Town Planning in their jo in t regulation No. 18/1968. (V. 23) MEM — EVM, 
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county  council). In  conform ity w ith G overnm ent Decree 27/1959. (V. 7) K orm . on the alienation 
of sm aller housing estates, the agencies of the council (d istric t or municipal) m erely m arked 
o u t housing esta tes p u t up  for sale [§. 3, clause (1)]. The sale o f housing estates earm arked for 
alienation was the function of the N ational Savings B ank [§. 3 clause (2)].
24 However, tem porarily  the councils were paid only the subsidies for 1969 and  1970, as 
th e  following years come within the period of the Fourth  Five-Y ear Plan.
25 Dr. Szabó, Béla: A kis- és középüzemek szerepe, a helyi ip a r fejlesztésének feltételei 
(The Role of Small and M edium Size Plants; Conditions of th e  D evelopm ent of Local Industry). 
In s titu te  o f Sociology of the C entral Committee of the H ungarian  Socialist W orkers’ P arty , 
B udapest, 1969, MS, p. 49. According to a com parative analysis in F rance, in the clothing in ­
dustry  a  p lan t em ploying 200 workers a t  most is considered viable. As com pared to  th is figure in 
H ungary  even in the  council-owned clothing in dustry  there is a  strong trend  tow ards concentra­
tion. The significance of the local industry  has grow n owing to  the grow th of dem ands for se r­
vices. As has been m ade clear in th is paper, in the  cap ita list countries with highly developed
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econom y, 30 to  40 p e r  c e n t  o f th e  o v era ll ex p en ses o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  a re  a b so rb ed  b y  th e  Services. 
In  th e  S ov ie t U nion  30 p e r  c en t o f  th e  ov era ll co n su m p tio n  a re  ex p en d e d  fo r Services. In  h igh ly  
developed  econom ies, a  th ird  o r  even  one h a lf  o f  a ll w orkers a re  em p lo y ed  b y  th e  serv ieing  b ran- 
ches. I n  H u n g a ry  th e  ra tio n  is one th ird , b u t  o f  th e  e x p en d itu re  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  th e  Services 
ab so rb  30 p e r  c e n t on ly . As a  re su lt o f  th e  v igo rous d riv e  fo r  th e  e x p an s io n  o f  th e  Services in  
eom m un.al Services, th e  ra te  o f  th e  a n n u a l increase  a m o u n ts  to  ten  p e r cen t.
26 Cf. Dr. Sári, János, Tanácsi Szervek rendelkezése állam i tu lajdon fe le tt (Disposition over 
S tate P roperty  by th e  Agencies o f the Councils) Á llam  és Igazgatás, 1963. No. 4.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
I. Der sozialistische Inhalt der Ratsautonomic der Gemeinden 
und Städte und die wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit
Die w irtschaftlichen Aufgaben der R äte  sind m it der E ntw icklung der sozialistischen 
Dem okratie eng verbunden. Die E rhöhung der B edeutung der w irtschaftlichen Organisations- 
arbeit is t die F unktion  einerseits der politischen E ntw icklung der Gesellschaft, andererseits der 
sich in den m ateriellen Grundlagen der Gesellschaft abspielenden objektiven Prozesse.
Der neue Mechanismus der W irtschaftslenkung änderte  auch ¡den w irtschaftlichen W ir­
kungskreis der R äte . Im  Sinne der R ichtlinien der Reform  sind die R ä te  fü r die Entw icklung der 
Siedlungen -  auch  die O rganisierung des W ohnungsbaus inbegriffen -  fü r die Befriedigung der 
kom m unalen Bedürfnisse der Bewohner und fü r die E ntw icklung der D ienstleistungen ver­
antw ortlich und sie koordinieren die G ebietsentwicklung.
N ach dem  Ü bergang au f  das neue System  der W irtschaftslenkung wurde die allzu s ta rk  
zentralisierte Lenkung der V olkswirtschaft, das System  der W eisungen, durch die erhöhte A n­
wendung der ökonomischen H ebel, un ter diesen insbesondere durch  die der m ateriellen Anreize, 
ersetzt. Ein eigentüm licher W iderspruch der neuen S ituation besteh t darin , dass die S taa ts ­
unternehm en im Besitz einer grösseren Selbständigkeit sind, als welche die R atsorgane, die als 
E inheit der sozialistischen S taatsorganisation funktionieren, geniessen.
Dem Prinzip der jugoslawischen gesellschaftlichen Selbstverw altung gegenüber würden die 
higenlümerrechte der Räte, abweichend von den unm itte lbaren , jeden behördlichen Eingriffes 
freien E igentüm errechten der W erktätigen, einem solchen V ertretungsorgan zukom m en, das 
als 7 etl der einheitlichen sozialistischen Staatsorganisation funk tion iert und in diesem R ahm en 
Selbstverw altungsrechte geniesst.
II. Die Regelung des Gemeindeeigentums im bürgerlichen tingarislien Rechtssystem
Die Methode der Regelung des G emeindeeigentum s, begründet im  Gesetz X X II : 1886, 
verdient unsere B eachtung. D em nach übte die Gemeinde Eigentumsrecht über unbewegliche und  
bewegliche Sachen aus. Sie konnte  erben, Geschenke annehm en und entgeltliche Verträge ab - 
schliessen. Ein besonderer T yp  der V erträge war der öffentliche Liefervertrag, aber daneben waren 
im Gesetz noch weitere E inschränkungen des D ispositionsrechtes aufgezählt (V erkauf des G rund­
vermögens, von Liegenschaften nur m it Genehmigung des übergeordneten Organs). Zwar wurde 
der Gebrauch des Gemeindeeigentum s, das Geltendm achen des D ispositionsrechtes u n te r w irk­
sam er zentraler A ufsicht ausgeübt, gab es doch die Möglichkeit zur Entfaltung der Eigentümer- 
gesichtspunkte und  zu  der Verwirklichung der dam it verbundenen Verantwortungsformen.
in . Das Entstehen der sozialistischen Eigentumsverhältnisse 
und die Vermögensrechte der Räte
Nach dem  E n tstehen  des ersten sozialistischen S taates, der Sow jetgew alt, w ar die B estre­
bung nach einer starken K onzentration , die starke  zentrale Leitung notw endig, die ihren Stempel 
uu /h  au f die Regelung der E igentum srechtsform en aufdrückte. Die örtlichen Organe des sozia­
listischen S taates üben aber bei der A usübung ihrer w irtschaftlichen O rganisationsfunktionen 
sit'hr umfangreiche R echte aus.
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Unsere R äte , in  ers ter Reihe die Gemeinde- und S tad trä te  können aufgrund der Rechts- 
regeln auch  heu te  um fangreiche D ispositionsrechte über in staatlichem  E igentum  stehenden 
Liegenschaften ausiiben, die die Räte zwar nicht form ell, doch inhaltlich zum  Eigentümer machen.
Das E igentum  der R ä te  als selbständige E igentum sform  stünde n ich t im G egensatz zum 
Volkseigentum , denn es läge innerhalb dessen. Das V olkseigentum is t näm lich eine sehr weite K a ­
tegorie, die ausd rück t, dass säm tliche K lassen und  G ruppen der G esellschaft au f gleicher Weise 
m it den in V olkseigentum stehenden E igentum sobjekten  verbunden sind, ohne dass sich u n te r 
ihnen ausbeutungsähnliche Verhältnisse bilden könnten.
Die G rundlagen der A btrennung des R atseigentum s:
— das D ispositionsrecht über das gesellschaftliche E igentum  kann  n ich t vollständig zen tra ­
lisiert werden; eine rationelle D ezentralisierung is t notw endig;
— aufgrund der B estim m ung des E igentum s b ilde t sich eine G ebietstrennung aus;
— die F inanzierung des G ebrauchs des E igentum s is t auch  ein G rund der A btrennung:
— die V erantw ortungsform en können besser d ifferenziert werden.
IV. Materielle Grundlagen der wirtschaftlichen Organisationstätigkeit der Räte
1. 11,7% der Ausgaben des H aushaltvoranschlags fü r das J a h r  1970 w erden durch  die R äte  
verw irklicht. Im  Zweig des Gesundheitswesens is t ih r A nteil 85% , im  sozialen Zweig 92% . 99% 
der Schülergruppen der G rundschulen, 80% der der M ittelschulen werden in Schulen u n te r 
R atsle itung  un te rrich te t.
70% der E innahm en der R ä te  stam m en aus eigenen Quellen, 30% aus staatlichem  B eitrag.
2. Die E innahm en des Entw icklungsfonds d e r R ä te  überschreiten im Ja h r  1970 die Summ e 
von 10 Milliarden Forint.
3. Im  R ahm en der U nternehm ensw irtschaft gehören beinahe 1000 U nternehm en m it e tw a 
einer halben Million W erktätigen zu den R äten . Die E inzahlungen der U nternehm en bilden 30% 
der E innahm en der R äte.
Der A nteil der R ä te  am  G rundm itte lbestand  der V olksw irtschaft in B udgetverw altung 
be träg t 50% , an dem  in V erw altung der U nternehm en 5% .
V. Festlegung des Krcisses und Charakters des Ratseigentums
In  e rs ter R eihe m üssten die Gemeinde- und  Stadträte m it E igentüm errechten  bezüglich 
der durch sie geleiteten B udgetinstitu tionen und  U nternehm en au sg es ta tte t werden. Neben 
den Gemeinde- und S tad trä ten  könnten auch die R ä te  höheren N iveaus in  einem beschränkten  
K reis in den B esitz von E igentüm errechten  kom m en.
Die A nerkennung der E igentüm errechte der R ä te  könnte  bei G eltendm achung folgender 
R echtsgrundsätze erfolgen:
a) auch  bezüglich des Gebrauchs des R atseigentum s kom m t die zentrale leitende Rolle 
des S taates durch  Erlassen von N orm ativen, durch  A nwendung der M ittel der S taatsverw altung  
und durch  Anwendung von w irtschaftlichen H ebeln zur Geltung;
b) das R atseigentum  is t kein G ruppeneigentum . Dem C harakter nach is t es sozialistischer 
E igentum , Teil des Volkseigentums, gleichwertig m it dem  Staatseigentum . Die S taatsbürges 
können u n te r gleichen Bedingungen am  G ebrauch der E igentum sobjekte teilnehm en;
c) die E igentüm errechte ausübenden R äte sind Organe, die als Teil der einheitlichen sozia­
listischen Staatsorganisation  funktionieren. Ih re  w irtschaftliche T ätigkeit erfo lg t entsprechend 
dem  G rundsatz des dem okratischen Zentralism us u n te r zentraler A ufsicht, deren institu tioneile 
Form en folgende sind:
— Genehmigung des K aufs und  Verkaufs der Liegenschaften durch  das übergeordnete 
Organ,
— w irtschaftliche und finanzielle Revision der B udgetorgane,
— K ontrolle der R ichtigkeit der Bilanz, der E inzahlung der S teuern  und der B udgetein­
zahlungen der U nternehm en.
d) Die grundlegenden Produktionsm itte l bleiben auch w eiterhin in S taatseigentum , m it 
deren G ebrauch die Zentralorgane des S taates die E ntw icklungstendenzen der V olksw irtschaft 
w irkungsvoll beeinflussen können.
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РЕЗЮМЕ
I. Социалистческое содержание самоуправления сельских и городских советов 
и хозяйственная самостоятельность
Хозяйственные задачи советов тесно связаны с развитием социалистической демок­
ратии. Увеличение значения хозяйственно-организаторской работы зависит с одной сто­
роны от политического развития общества, а с другой стороны от объективных процессов 
материальных основ общества.
Новый механизм правления хозяйством изменил и экономическую компетенцию 
советов. По директивам реформы советы несут ответственность за развитие поселений, 
— в том числе и за организацию жилищных строительств, — за удовлетворение комму­
нальных потребностей населения, за развитие обслуживании и координируют террито­
риальное развитие.
При переходе к новой системе хозяйственного правления слишком централизованное 
правление народным хозяйством и система, основанная на инструкциях, сменялись более 
эффективным применением экономических регуляторов, в том числе прежде всего при­
менением материальных стимулов. Свойственным противоречием нового положения явля­
ется то, что государственные предприятия м о г у т  хозяйничать более самостоятельно, чем 
органы советов, действующие хозяйственной единицей социалистической государствен­
ной организации.
Противоположно принципу югославианского общественного самоуправления и в от­
личие от непосредственного собственнического правомочия трудящихся, свободного от 
вмешательства государственной власти, собственнические правомочия советов принадлежа­
ли бы такому представительному органу, который действует, как часть сдинной государ­
ственной социалистической организации и внутри ее осуществляет права самоуправления.
II. Регулирование сельской собственности в венгерском 
буржуазном правопорядке
Заслуживает внимание метод регулирования сельской собственности, предусмотрен­
ный XXII законом 1886. г. Согласно этому селу принадлежало право собственности дви­
жимых и недвижимых имуществ. Оно могло получить наследство, подарки и заключить 
возмездные сделки. Свойственным видом дог оворов был договор коммунальной поставки, 
но кроме этого в законе имеются и другие ограничения, стесняющие право распоряжения 
(продажа основного и недвижимого имущества разрешением вышестоящего органа). 
Хотя использование сельской собственности и осуществление права распоряжения ими 
проводились при эффективной центральной проверке, все таки дали возможность для 
создания собственнического воззрения и для реализации форм ответственности, связанных 
с ними.
III. Происхождение отношений социалистической собственности 
и имущественные правомочия советов
После возникновения советской власти, первого советского государства, необходимым 
явилось стремление к сильной концентрации, к сильному центральному правлению, кото­
рое повлияло и на регулирование юридических форм собственности. Однако местные орга­
ны социалистического государства осуществляют широкие правомочия, выполняя свои 
хозяйственно-организационные функции.
Наши советы, прежде всего сельские и городские советы, на основе юридических 
норм и теперь м о г у т  иметь право распоряжаться принадлежащим г осударству имуще­
ством, которое делает советы, хотя не формально, но по содержанию собственниками.
Собственность совета, как самостоятельная форма собственности не противостояло 
бы общенародной собственности, ибо имело бы место в ее рамках. Общенародная собствен­
ность же, — очень широкая категория и выражает, что все классы и группы общества 
одинаково связываются с предметами, находящимися в общенародной собственности 
без того, чтобы среди них появились бы эксплуататорские отношения.
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Основы отграничения собственности совета:
-  нельзя полно централизировать право распоряжения общественной собствен­
ностью; необходима рациональная децентрализация;
-  на основе назначения собственности создается территориальное отделение;
-  это отделение оправдывается и финансированием пользования собственностью;
-  формы ответственности могут быть более диференцированными.
IV. Материальные основы хозяйственно-организационной деятельности советов
1. 11,7% расчета расходов по государственному бюджету 1970 г. реализируется со­
ветами, 85% в отрасли здравоохранения, 92% в социальных отраслях. 99% групп учени­
ков начальных школ и 80% учеников средних школ учится в школах, находящихся в 
управлении советов.
70% доходов советов исходит из собственных источников, а 30% из государствен­
ных взносов.
2. Доходы фонда развития советов в 1970 г. превышают 10 миллиардов форинтов.
3. В рамках управления предприятиями советам принадлежит около тысячи пред­
приятий, имеющих приблизительно полмиллиона рабочих. Внесения предприятий состав­
ляют 30% дохода советов. Советы получают 50% бюджетного состава основных фондов 
народного хозяйства, и 5% из бюджета предприятий.
V. Определение сферы и характера собственности совета
Необходимо было бы присвоить право собственника прежде всего сельским и город­
ским советам по отношению бюджетных учреждений и предприятии, управляемых ими. 
Наряду с сельскими и городскими советами, советы высшей ступени могли бы иметь права 
собственника в ограниченном кругу.
Признание собственнического правомочия советов происходило бы по следующим 
юридическим принципам:
а) Центральная руководящая роль государства осуществляется и в области исполь­
зования собственности советов посредством издания норм, применением средств государ­
ственной власти п хозяйственных с т и м у л о в .
б) Собственность совета не является групповой собственностью, но по характеру это 
социалистическая собственность, часть общенародной собственности, равна государствен­
ной собственности. Граждане государства при равных условиях м о г у т  пользоваться пред­
метами собственности.
в) Советы, осуществляющие права собственности являются органами, действующие 
как часть единой социалистической государственной власти. Их хозяйство ведется соглас­
но принципу демократического централизма при центральной проверке, организованные 
формы которой:
-  требование разрешения вышестоящих органов для купли-продажи недвижимых 
имуществ,
-  хозяйственная н финансовая проверка бюджетных органов,
-  проверка подлинности баланса предприятий, уплаты налога и вноса в бюджет.
г) Основные средства производства остаются и в дальнейшем в государственной 
собственности, использованием которых центральные органы государства успешно влия­
ют на развитие народного хозяйства.
1 0  AXNALES — Sectio Iu rid ica  — Tom us X II .
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